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Speaking in Tongues: Some Comments 
on Multilingualism 
BY CATHARINE PEIRCE WELLS* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to be here and especially grateful to all of you for the 
special sense of collegiality and friendship that I experience whenever I 
come to these meetings. 
The topic is language, and I would like to begin my comments on 
this morning's papers by pulling together some of the threads of yester-
day's discussion. Two themes in particular seem relevant. 
The first, is the power of language not only to communicate, but 
also to exclude. Yesterday morning, we held a panel! discussion in 
which the participants spoke about their first experiences with enforced 
bilingualism. Olga Moya, for example, spoke movingly of her first day 
in school when she and several of her classmates were punished for 
lapsing into Spanish in a moment of crisis. She also observed that many 
of these same students did not remain in school for very long. 
The second is the power of language to shape identity and self 
expression. Yesterday morning, Yvonne Tamayo spoke about the many 
things she could say in Spanish but was unable to express in English. 
Berta Hernandez-Truyol made a similar point at the first plenary2 when 
she talked about how she often thinks in English but experiences her 
emotions in Spanish. And Madeleine Plasencia elaborated on the sub-
ject when she spoke about how languages are an integral element of who 
we are; how they shape not only our personal sense of self, but also our 
identity in the outside world. 
PERSONAL DIALECTS 
I will begin, as the panelists did yesterday, with a few remarks 
about my own linguistic background. I share this as a way of acknowl-
edging my own limited perspective on these matters. I was raised in an 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1968 Wellesley College; M.A. 
1973, Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School. 
I. The Structures of Latinalo Subordination: Intersections in Law and Life, Moderator: 
Olga Moya; Presenters: Laura Padilla, Yvonne Tamayo, and Rey Valencia; and Commentator: 
Donna Young. 
2. BetweenlBeyond Colors: Outsiders Within Latinalo Communities, Moderator: Pedro 
Malavet; Panelists: Roberto Corrada, Berta Hemandez-Truyol, and Rudy Busto; Commentators: 
David Cruz and Jenny Rivera. 
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English speaking home. The language of my childhood had a lot of 
depth and subtlety when it came to abstract discussion, but it was also 
very limited. Most of my family expressed personal preferences in the 
abstract language of moral theory. Thus, if my mother wanted me to 
stop drumming on the table, she might say, "good girls don't do that 
kind of thing," or "you ought to refrain from that type of behavior." 
Requests were often met in terms of entitlements or fairness. One's par-
ent might say, "it would not be fair to buy you an ice cream cone when I 
can't very well buy one for your sister." Even sibling rivalry had a firm 
and decisive answer. "Comparisons are odious!", was my father's fre-
quent refrain? Statements of feeling: "I feel angry, upset, sad or tired," 
or requests, "I want to go home", or "I want to go out and play" were 
treated as inconsequential and annoying interruptions to real conversa-
tion. In this way, you might say, I learned to speak like a lawyer at my 
mother's knee. 
By contrast, I was married for a long time to a man whose first 
language was not English but Greek. As a result, I learned Greek play-
fully as a language of love and affection. 
When I was in graduate school, philosophy was primarily a study 
of language. I learned that every so-called natural language (such as 
English, Spanish or Greek as opposed to artificial languages like Cobal, 
Logic or Mathematics) consists of a number of different dialects. This 
helped me to understand that the dialects of a language are not confined 
to regional variations in accent and vocabulary. They also represent 
ways of speaking the same language in the context of different values 
and ways of life. And so, as an adult, I've come to understand that the 
lawyer-like language that I learned from my family is merely one dialect 
of what we call the English language. As such, it is both a very power-
ful tool and the source of many of my personal limitations. It was as if 
my Anglo ancestors had given me a magic wand that I could use to ace 
my way through a lifetime of standardized tests and academic rituals. 
In non-academic areas, however, the limitations of my lanugauge 
are palpable. Language is not only a means of communication; it is also 
an incredibly powerful form of social control. The words of one's lan-
guage draw a decisive boundary between what one can and cannot say. 
And I cannot say many things - things I would like to say; things tat 
may of you take for granted. It is clear that my particular English dialect 
3. A friend of mine reading this comment said: "You must be exaggerating. People don't 
talk like that to their children." However, I am not exaggerating. In my community of origin, this 
way of putting things was not necessarily perceived as cold or insensitive. It was simply the way 
people talked - not just my family but most of the people I knew in the rural area near Boston 
where I grew up. 
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was a firm expression - for better and for worse - of the kind of 
person my Anglo ancestors had hoped I would become. 
SCHOLARLY DIALECTS 
Each of the papers this morning has used a different scholarly dia-
lect to examine the problem with English-only legislation. The result 
has been an interesting and informative discussion. For my own part, I 
would like to reflect a little on the choice of scholarly dialect and on 
how we both lose and gain when we choose to speak within the confines 
of an academic discourse. Before starting, I should say that, as a prag-
matist, I am a pluralist about scholarly dialects. Life is multifaceted and 
complex. Genuine insight is hard to obtain - hard enough so that we 
should not handicap ourselves by deciding, in advance, that all knowl-
edge must conform to the relatively rigid requirements of a single aca-
demic discourse. But, while it is good to have a choice of many tools, it 
is important to use them with awareness. When we talk in a particular 
scholarly dialect, we may gain insight and understanding, but we may 
also lose our ability to talk about other aspects of a problem - aspects 
that in other circumstances we might consider to be the crux of the mat-
ter. This is particularly true when we talk about language itself. 
Language, by its very nature, is a distillate of human culture. Hid-
den within it are many of the values that animate those who speak it. 
We should be careful therefore, when we subject language to the rigors 
of an academic analysis.4 Whether the discourse analyzes language as 
an economic commodity, a badge of personhood, or a matter of practical 
politics, we should keep in mind that language is not an abstract object 
that can be readily disconnected from its cultural and spiritual 
dimensions. 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
In this spirit, let's think about the law and economics discourse that 
Bill Bratton so skillfully wove into this morning's discussion. He made 
an important point: we should not be so quick to concede the efficiency 
rationales for English-only legislation. Whether English-only legislation 
is a matter of genuine efficiency or whether it is, as Bill suggests, simply 
a question of Anglo special-interest legislation makes a real difference to 
our understanding of the issue. Even so, we must remember that law 
4. For example, in the past hundred years, Anglo-American philosophy has devoted much 
effort to relatively straightforward attempts at describing and analyzing natural languages. The 
difficulties of analyzing language are amply demonstrated by the puzzles and paradoxes that are 
offered by Wittgenstein as a commentary on this approach. See, e.g. his PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS. 
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and economics is a particular dialect and thus can only represent a par-
tial perspective. Like every academic dialect, it will highlight certain 
aspects of the problem, but this will occur at the expense of doing a poor 
job of illuminating the rest. Thus, even under the best of circumstances, 
we should be careful not to place too much emphasis on questions of 
efficiency. We should remember the reasons for skepticism. 
One reason to be skeptical is that economic analysis tends to 
assume that anything worth counting can be fully understood as an item 
of commerce. Thus, if we are talking about widgets, one assumes that 
every widget is a fungible commodity and that there is no serious obsta-
cle to understanding the value of the widget solely in terms of its mone-
tary value.5 This assumption may work well for widgets, it might even 
work well for artificial languages such as those that are used in computer 
programming. However, it is less likely to work well as a way of ana-
lyzing the use of natural languages. Since natural languages construct 
identity and value, they are unlikely to be well understood by a dis-
course that limits the concept of value to fully formed and numerically 
quantifiable preferences. 
A second reason for skepticism is that law and economics has tradi-
tionally offered very little insight into the real world disparities of power 
and wealth. One problem is that it tends to convert every question of 
distributive justice into a question of redistributive justice. Because the 
touchstone of economic analysis is the concept of efficiency, an econo-
mist is likely to begin her analysis of distributive questions by consider-
ing the relative efficiency of various systems of property rights. Thus, if 
fairness is to enter into the analysis, it must do so at a later stage when, 
for example, we consider whether the taxing system should playa sig-
nificant role in redistributing income or capital. Yet since claims for 
redistribution inevitably raise objections about entitlements and expecta-
tions (not to mention the costs of redistribution), this move tends to 
undermine claims that are based upon notions of justice and fairness. 
A third reason to be skeptical about the economics of linguistic 
regulation is the failure of economic thought to provide a framework for 
making meaningful distinctions between systematic forms of discrimina-
tion and the aggregation of individual preferences. For example, when 
women employees sued Sears alleging gender disparities in wages paid 
to sales personnel, it was possible for economists to argue on both sides 
of the issue. Some argued that wage discrepancies stemmed from dis-
crimination, while others economists suggested that they could be 
"explained" in terms of the preference of female workers for selling 
lower priced, non-commissionable items. A similar ambiguity exists 
5. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
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with respect to English-only legislation. Bill Bratton spoke about how 
discrimination against Latina/os has limited the incentives for Spanish 
speaking Latina/os to become bilingual. This might be true, but, from 
an economic perspective it is not obvious. As an alternative, an econo-
mist might argue that the choice to live in "enclave communities" and 
take lower paying, Spanish-speaking jobs reflects the cultural prefer-
ences of individual and autonomous players. 
DEONTIC THEORIES OF PERSONHOOD 
In her presentation, Dru Cornell offered an analysis of English-only 
that is based upon Kantian conceptions of personhood. This sort of 
deontic theory is frequently understood as a more humanistic alternative 
to economic analysis. Thus, while the economist thinks of human 
beings as aggregations of preferences backed by dollars, the Kantian 
conceives of them as non-negotiable subjects of respect and value. It is 
this conception of personhood that permits Dru to make a case for 
respecting each person in their choice of linguistic expression. 
The advantages of such an approach are obvious. In a Kantian 
world, the value to a person of speaking one's own language cannot be 
sacrificed to the overall efficiency of human communication. While this 
seems promising, it is important to note that, for Kant, respect for others 
is derived from the sense that they share what is most essential about 
ourselves. When Kantians respect the personhood of others, they are 
being fundamentally reverential to human sameness rather than human 
difference. What we can't get from Kant is the notion that what is 
sacred in you is fundamentally different from what is sacred in me; that 
someone who differs is - for that very reason - especially worthy of 
respect. On Kantian grounds, for example, I can see that it is wrong to 
promote English speaking at the expense of Spanish speakers. I can 
understand that it deprives them of something that, were I in their posi-
tion, I too would value. But it takes something more than Kant to help 
me understand the poverty of my own English-only perspective. When I 
begin to understand that what is "other" is sacred, then I know that Eng-
lish-only legislation is not just unfair to Spanish speakers, but that it also 
deprives me, as an English speaker, of something valuable that I can get 
in no other way. 
CONCLUSION 
As part of her presentation this morning, Sharon Hom told a won-
derful story about her son's attempt to author Penelope's diary and his 
ability to express what he imagined as her needs across great barriers of 
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gender, race, culture, time, and history. Her story conveys a lot of what 
I find valuable in the concept of multilingualism. 
Multilingualism offers an alternative to cultural imperialism. It 
seeks genuine communication rather than an understanding of others as 
partial replications of ourselves. Genuine communication is hard. It 
happens only when we commit ourselves to real flights of imagination 
and expression. And, to be successful, we must surround these efforts 
with an atmosphere of love and respect for one another. Because I 
believe this is possible, I think we should not get too caught up in what 
the economists call the cost of multi-linguilism. Instead, we might 
explore the possibility that by paying close attention to what is said in 
other languages, we can heal the pains of our own limitation and partial-
ity. In short, what we need to focus on is the gift of otherness, the 
opportunities of multi-linguilism and the possibility that through differ-
ence we can find wholeness. 
